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BAR BRIEFS
If any one of our members does not like this little expression
and does not regard it as a fairly neutral expression, I apologize, if
he will promise to read this statement again.
THE SUPREME COURT
There has been received at ye Editor's desk so much comment on the proposition above entitled, that it is impossible to review them in this small publication for your consideration. Some
conclusion, of course, is inevitable as an admitted proposition; six
members of the Court are over the prescribed age, the effect of
the proposal would be to add six new members to the Court, unless they saw fit to resign or "retire", as it has been described.
Again the proposal has been described (not inaptly) as an attempt
to "pack" the Court.
Perhaps one can safely quote that remarkable man, James
Brice, in his great work "The American Commonwealth", when he
referred to such a proposal as "immoral in substance". His comments on the Supreme Court are in Chapter XXIV ("The Work
of the Courts",) from which the following quotation is taken (New
and Revised Edition, Vol. 1 pages 276-277):
"The Fathers of the Constitution studied nothing more
than to secure the complete independence of the judiciary.
The President was not permitted to remove the judges, nor
Congress to diminish their salaries. One thing only was
either forgotten or deemed undesirable, because highly inconvenient, to determine - the number of judges in the Supreme
Court. Here was a weak point, a joint in the court's armour
through which a weapon might some day penetrate. Congress having in 1801, pursuant to a power contained in the
Constitution, established sixteen Circuit Courts, President
Adams, immediately before he quitted office, appointed members of his own party to the justiceships thus created. When
President Jefferson came in, he refused to admit the validity
of the appointment; and the newly elected Congress, which
was in sympathy with him, abolished the Circuit Courts themselves, since it could find no other means of ousting the new
justices. This method of attack, whose constitutionality has
been much doubted, cannot be used against the Supreme
Court, because that tribunal is directly created by the Constitution. But as the Constitution does not prescribe the number of justices, a statute may increase or diminish the number as Congress thinks fit. In 1866 when Congress was in
fierce antagonism to President Johnson, and desired to prevent him from appointing any judges, it reduced the number,
which was then ten, by a statute providing that no vacancy
should be filled up till the number was reduced to seven. In
1869, when Johnson had been succeeded by Grant, the number
was raised to nine, and presently the altered court allowed
the question of the validity of the Legal Tender Act, just before determined, to be reopened. This method is plainly sus-

BAR BRIEFS
ceptible of further and possibly dangerous application. Suppose a Congress and President bent on doing something which
the Supreme Court deems contrary to the Constitution. They
pass a statute. A case arises under it. The court on the
hearing of the case unanimously declares the statute to be
null, as being beyond the powers of Congress. Congress
forthwith passes and the President signs another statute
more than doubling the number of justices. The President
appoints to the new justiceships men who are pledged to hold
the former statute constitutional. The Senate confirms his
appointments. Another case raising the validity of the disputed statute is brought up to the Court. The new Justices
outvote the old ones; the statute is held valid; the security
provided for the protection of the Constitution is gone like
a morning mist.
"What prevents such assaults on the fundamental lawassaults which, however immoral in substance, would be perfectly legal in form? Not the mechanism of government, for
all its checks have been evaded. Not the conscience of the
legislature and the President, for heated combatants seldom
shrink from justifying the means by the end. Nothing but
the fear of the people, whose broad good sense and attachment to the great principles of the Constitution may generally
be relied on to condemn such a perversion of its forms. Yet
if excitement has risen high over the country, a majority of
the people may acquiesce; and then it matters little whether
what is really a revolution be accomplished by openly violating or by merely distorting the forms of law. To the
people we come sooner or later; it is upon their wisdom and
self-restraint that the stability of the most cunningly devised
scheme of government will in the last resort depend."
Opponents of the President's proposal object to it on the
ground that it would make the Supreme Court subservient to the
President. And, yet, some of them would substitute, for the
President's proposal, one which would make any act of Congress
constitutional if, after having been declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, it should be reapproved or reenacted by
two-thirds of the Congress. A proposed constitutional amendment, having the purpose and effect last mentioned, is now pending. This proposal would substitute a new form of subserviency
for that proposed by the President; it would make the Supreme
Court subservient to the Congress, rather than to the President.
Any proposal to make the Supreme Court subservient to either the President or the Congress should provide thinking people
with food for thought, particularly those who belong to classes
who have been subject, in the past, and may, again, be subject to
class persecution.
CONSTITUTION PROTECTS MINORITIES
It should be remembered that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution were designed to protect minorities

